Information Radio Network

The world is beginning to reshape itself as a result of the war in Iraq. Old alliances have soured, deteriorated, or become irrelevant. New alliances are being forged around emerging realities. And, as many of the pre-war prognosticators indicated would be the case, there have been “many surprises.”

In the early stages of the military action, there was, in many parts of the world, a sense of hope that the U.S. might get its butt kicked in Iraq, where they would be fighting a wily and unpredictable enemy on its own terms, on its own turf. That was a serious miscalculation of the military might of the U.S. and the extent of planning that took place before troops were deployed. The magnitude of U.S. military power that was demonstrated in Iraq has had its effect around the world, with reaction ranging from stunned disbelief to shock and anger.

In the Arab world, there has not been the eruption that many predicted. There have been demonstrations, but not the wholesale uprising of the “Arab street” that was forecast almost gleefully prior to the beginning of the war in Iraq. The Iraqi military was regarded as one of the strongest militaries in the Arab world, and its collapse has, in a sense, served to elicit more shock and awe than the thousands of bombs dropped by Coalition forces. Even Iran, whose military is probably more substantial than that of Iraq, has lately adopted a more cautious tone in international dialogue.

In Europe, especially in France and Germany, there has been a somewhat stunned recognition that the U.S. does not need them in order to prevail militarily against powers like Iraq. Their military irrelevance having been exposed, the question immediately shifted to political strategies. France and Germany seem now to be playing out their less-than-powerful hands in a tricky, high-stakes poker game. They have seen that picking another fight with the U.S. will not serve them well at home or in the international arena. Jacques Chirac is feeling the effects of the American boycott of French exports, and a recent poll showed that 46% of the French population feels that France has become isolated in the world. Chirac’s personal poll numbers were very high prior to the war in Iraq, but are now dropping.

Once the outcome in Baghdad seemed certain, France, Russia and Germany hastily convened a summit, which one writer referred to as a “gathering of the irrelevant and petulant” (Strategic Forecasting, 16 April, 2003). Evidence is gathering that those three nations—the members of the UN Security Council that so adamantly opposed Operation Iraqi Freedom—have been in flagrant violation of UN sanctions in Iraq for years. Now, they now want significant oversight roles in Iraq's interim administration and reconstruction.

Russia, whose stance is weaker even than France or Germany, certainly does not want a fight with the U.S. They are desperate to collect at least a part of the huge debt owed them by Iraq, but they know that Washington ultimately has more power to decide the outcome than they do.

On April 16, French President Jacques Chirac telephoned President George Bush and laid out his “pragmatic” approach for the reconstruction of Iraq. Strategic Forecasting (April 16, 2003) writers summed it up as follows: “If you let me off the hook and maybe give me a small piece of the action, I’ll discover that the United States is doing a great job in reconstructing Iraq. And if I fall into line, so will the Germans.” According to Chirac’s reasoning, if France and Germany fall into line, the global media will follow suit, choosing to see the war and the reconstruction process in a positive light.

President Bush can probably afford to let the “petulant three” sweat for a while.

What About Syria?
What to do about Syria is another question. Documents have come to light in Baghdad that directly incriminate Syria as a full partner in the financing, development, and concealment of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs. Additionally, details of a military collaboration treaty signed by Syrian President Bashar Assad and Saddam Hussein are now emerging. Under its terms, Syria would furnish an escape hatch for fleeing members of the upper echelons of Iraqi military, political, scientific and intelligence establishment that were working on banned weapons programs, and would provide concealed locations for production to continue in Syria.

DEBKAfiles.com reveals that beginning April 14, groups of Iraqi military and scientific leaders had already been transferred from Syria to France. These discoveries led the Bush administration to deliver a three-part ultimatum to Syria, which demands that the Assad regime:
1. Dismantle the command centers of the Lebanese Hizballah and the Palestinian Jihad Islami and Hamas Damascus headquarters and turn their leaders (whose names were supplied) over to the U.S.
2. Hand over all weapons of mass destruction on its territory, whether they are of Iraqi or Syrian origin.
3. Surrender to the Americans every one of the hundreds of Iraqi regime members, including Saddam kinsmen, who have been granted asylum in Syria.

Assad’s failure to deliver on these demands would result in the U.S. acting to force compliance. How that would be accomplished has not been explicitly stated. We have already employed one strategy in cutting off the pipeline that sends Iraqi oil through Syria. Another economic measure might be a blockade of Syrian ports. If Syria does not turn over Iraqi leaders it is harboring, we might reserve the right of hot pursuit, striking at the time and (to use General Vincent Brooks’ oft-used phrase) “in a manner of our choosing.”

In any event, as Charles Krauthammer wrote recently, “We cannot allow it (Syrian problem) to harden into a situation in which Syria becomes headquarters and sponsor of a guerrilla/terrorist campaign that slowly bleeds us in Iraq, undoes our victory and forces our retreat” (TownHall.com, April 18).

Secretary of State Colin Powell told reporters on April 15, “There is no war plan right now to attack somewhere else.” However, neither Bush nor Rumsfeld made any such assurances. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff two weeks ago ordered the U.S. European Command to prepare a plan for Syria.

DEBKA reported April 15 that small teams of American undercover troops were already inside Syria, marking out the hideouts of Saddam’s close family, his top lieutenants, military leaders and the directors of his banned weapons programs. U.S. special forces were also directed to locate the men who drive the operations of Hizballah, Jihad Islami and Hamas terror groups that work openly out of Syria.

With Syria, President Bush is not invoking international law, as he did when seeking UN sanction for military intervention in Iraq. He simply warned on April 13, “Syria just needs to cooperate with us.” The President’s non-mention of international authority speaks to this writer of a possible intention to handle the Syrian problem without repeating the fruitless debacle of UN debate that preceded the war in Iraq.

Regional Military Presence
Back in February, Saudi Deputy Defense Minister Prince Khaled bin Sultan said he expected no-fly zones to be eliminated following war with Iraq, and along with them, the need for a Western military presence in Saudi Arabia.

On April 15, General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced that U.S. troops might no longer be needed in Saudi Arabia. That appears to be payment for the fact that Riyadh kept its criticism of the war to a minimum and refrained from taking formal measures against the war. Additionally, U.S. forces were allowed to quietly fly missions out of Saudi Arabia during the war, and CENTCOM moved large numbers of troops through Saudi territory.

Realistically, there will be long-term deployment of U.S. troops in the Middle East, but in Iraq and places other than Saudi Arabia. The bases in Iraq carry few, if any, restrictions for U.S. troops and are strategically placed to address problems in Iran (which is another, very important part of the equation, to be addressed later at this site) Syria, or Saudi Arabia. The U.S. still has bases in Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. The Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar offers everything the Prince Sultan Air base in Saudi Arabia had and more. Additionally, Oman reportedly is interested in further opening its bases to U.S. troops.

The long-term strategy in the Middle East must be to maintain pressure against al Qaeda and those countries that collaborate with al Qaeda. The short-term stance, especially with regard to Syria, is not yet clear. It is probable we will see some sign of where Washington is heading in the days just ahead.